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Alejandro Bendana Rodriguez speaks English as eloquently and comfortably as he does Spanish.
In either language, his ability to articulate and to analyze makes it clear why he became a principal
spokesperson for the Sandinista revolutionary government (1979-1990). Interviewed frequently
on Nightline, the McNeil Lehrer News Hour, Meet the Press, the McLaughlin Group, and other
US network programs, Bendana became a familiar face to the US public during the 1980s, as
Nicaragua came to occupy the limelight of US foreign policy. Less known is Bendana's role as
one the principal architects of Nicaraguan foreign policy during the last decade. Bendana, who
holds a doctorate in history from Harvard University, was Nicaragua's Ambassador to the United
Nations (1979-1982) and Ambassador to the Non-Aligned Movement (1982-1983), before being
appointed as Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry in 1983. From this position, which he held
until May 1990, Bendana was a key participant in the design and implementation of Nicaraguan
diplomacy, and played a major role in the Central American peace process. Bendana is currently
director of the Center for International Studies (CEI) in Managua. This "think tank" was founded
by former Nicaraguan government foreign policy experts, under the aegis of the Jesuit-run Central
American University, after the Sandinistas lost the elections to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and
the National Opposition Union (UNO). "As the result of the end of the Cold War, there are new
possibilities for the attainment of stability and democracy in the areas of the Third World where
armed conflict has been the norm," says Bendana. The CEI, he says, has been set up to facilitate
"the deepest reflection on the Nicaraguan revolution's international experience." According to
Bendana,"Central America was the earliest testing ground: for the first time in history a liberation
movement that came to power by armed struggle and with control over the armed forces becomes
a legal opposition party. In El Salvador and Guatemala, armed insurrectionary movements indicate
they are willing to participate in free elections and to negotiate the terms of competition with the
government in office." Bendana was recently invited by University of New Mexico to Albuquerque,
where Latin America Data Base (LADB) staff members interviewed him on Nicaraguan affairs since
the elections, and on the Sandinistas' perspectives on the new international order emerging in the
post-Cold War era. LADB news analyst William I. Robinson and project director Nelson Valdes
conducted the interview. [See CAU 11/30/90 for Part 2 of the interview, titled, "The New Post-Cold
War Contradiction North & South, Rich vs. Poor: Interview with Alejandro Bendana."] LADB:
How do you characterize the general crisis political, social, economic faced by Nicaragua today?
BENDANA: The crisis in Nicaragua today can be summed up as that of the necessary adjustment
which both the government and the revolutionary forces must make to a new, transitional period.
We Sandinistas like to call this the second stage of the Revolution the third one being in 1996,
when we expect to return to office. In this second stage, both the revolutionary forces and the
government must learn to work within the new guidelines. These guidelines are not simply the
product of the advent of a right-wing government, but rather were developed by the Revolution
and are reflected in the constitution. They call for respect for genuine pluralism and the exchange
of traditional armed methods of conflict for new, political mechanisms of conflict resolution. LADB:
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Violeta Barrios de Chamorro has been in power for several months now. It appears the expectations
that her campaign generated for people in and outside of Nicaragua have not been met. Is this so?
BENDANA: There were two sets of expectations, which reflected the two general issues before the
electorate in February 1990: the war and the economy. The entire Nicaraguan electorate, regardless
of how they voted, wanted an end to the war and an end to the economic agony. With regard to the
war, these expectations have been met since Mrs. Chamorro's government continued down the
path of negotiation and insisted on the contra demobilization that was initiated by the Sandinista
government and contained in the Esquipulas Plan. This is to the credit of the government. But a
tremendous debit is that they have not been able to do anything positive about the economy. They
are reaping the seeds they sowed in the sense that they promised an end to inflation and to restore
economic normality in 100 days. They made this promise never believing that they would actually
win the elections and thus did not prepare an economic program. But they also made their promise
on the presumption that there would be a massive flow of [foreign] economic assistance, which
never materialized. In addition, they initially attempted to ram through a privatization [promoting],
neo-liberal economic program that was being demanded by the [International Monetary Fund] and
the World Bank as a precondition for new loans. This aggravated the country's economic situation
even more, further reduced real wages, and resulted in a high monthly inflation rate. Far from
having improved, the situation has worsened. There have been two general strikes in protest of
economic policies. LADB: Why have significant levels of foreign assistance not materialized? Was
this a miscalculation on the part of the Chamorro government? Or is this just duplicity on the part
of the US government, which has yet to make real reparations to either Panama or Nicaragua?
BENDANA: I think it is a combination of both. But the sad historical reality is that Washington
has always been more disposed to appropriate funding as the result of security, Cold War, anticommunist considerations, rather than as a product of genuine concern for the development of
peoples. Seemingly, once the Sandinistas were voted out, the security threat ended. Thus, just
when the Nicaraguan people most needed assistance, that assistance was being cut off. The lesson
would seem [to be] that peace doesn't pay. And indeed, if Washington had employed only a fraction
of the funds that were used to try and overthrow the Sandinista government, the economic crisis
could be alleviated. But Washington was also surprised by the outcome of the February elections.
It had to scramble in order to attain $300 million dollars [approved by the US Congress in May at
the Bush administration's request]. This was a difficult proposition vis-a-vis Congress [at a time of
on-going fiscal crisis]. However, one marvels at the ability to get $300 million for [Angolan contra
leader Jonas] Savimbi, or for the Pol Pot coalition without much trouble from Congress. So we
can't really buy the fiscal imperative. What this just may be pointing to is differences between the
Chamorro government and the US on account of two basic factors. The first is the reluctance of
the Chamorro government to withdraw the World Court suit that found the United States guilty
of violating national and international law in its policies towards Nicaragua, and therefore ordered
the United States to make reparations. This is severely embarrassing to the [US] administration,
because Nicaragua's argument is the same one Mr. Bush is now using against Iraq: disregard for
international law, and a larger nation trampling on the sovereignty of a smaller nation. Secondly,
Washington seems to be challenging the pragmatism of the Chamorro administration in its dealings
with the FSLN, which is the principal opposition [force] and the largest political party in Nicaragua.
The Chamorro government has shown a disposition to try and find formulas for coexistence and to
rule by consensus where possible. In this context, the pragmatic thinking by the dominant elements
in the Chamorro government come into contradiction with the continued Cold War thinking, the
anti-Sandinista thinking, in Washington. This may help explain Washington's stinginess. LADB:
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Recent events would suggest a political situation in which the Sandinistas are more interested in
the Chamorro government's stability than are sectors of the former "contras." BENDANA: Symbolic
of this is Vice President Virgilio Godoy, who apparently hates President [Chamorro] more than
he hates the Sandinistas. There is an extreme right-wing sentiment against the FSLN, against 42%
of the electorate still very much alive and well. Ironically, the contra foot soldiers who are by and
large campesinos who simply want the government to give them the land they were offered are not
part of this right-wing movement. Instead, there is a coming together of extreme right-wing sectors
of the Church, extreme right-wing politicians, the vice president and his party, some local UNO
mayors, and the US Embassy, which is coalescing these extreme right-wing forces. This emerging
far-right coalition is manipulating the contras' legitimate demands for land in order to pressure the
government into taking a hard-line stance vis-a-vis Sandinismo, vis-a-vis the FSLN. They want to
roll back the social and legal gains made by the Nicaraguan people over the last 10 years, to violate
the terms of the Nicaraguan constitution. This threatens to throw the country into chaos, because the
FSLN is an indispensable part of Nicaraguan political culture and we can never return to pre-1979
situation. LADB: Do you see a split within contra ranks between foot soldiers who are seeking the
fulfillment of certain socio-economic demands demands which had been utilized to mobilize against
the Sandinistas and the contra leadership? Does the FSLN see some coming together of those contra
forces and Sandinismo? Some kind of popular front? What could develop? (cont.)
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